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I.  Introduction 
Cyber experts have long envisioned a day when the multiple password-based systems 
used for identification and authorization of individuals on the internet would be replaced with a 
singular, online identity.1  That day may be coming soon.  In 2011, the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST), the federal technology agency entrusted with development of 
industry standards, finalized the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace 
(NSTIC).2  Dubbed a “driver’s license” for the internet, 3 this policy envisions the creation of an 
Identity Ecosystem where individuals may forego their multiple password-based online identities 
for one secure identity used “for convenient, secure, and privacy-enhancing [internet] 
transactions anywhere, anytime.”4  Far beyond conceptual, two states and one federal agency 
                                                 
1 See Colin Wood, Are You Ready for a Driver’s License for the Internet?, GOV’T TECH. (Apr. 
25, 2014), http://www.govtech.com/security/Drivers-License-for-the-Internet.html.  
2 National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC), ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. 
CENTER, http://epic.org/privacy/nstic.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2014) [hereinafter NSTIC]. 
3 Natasha Singer, Call It Your Online Driver’s License, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2011, at BU4, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/18/business/online-id-verification-plan-carries-
risks.html.  
4 Naomi Lefkovitz, Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., Identity in Cyberspace: Improving Trust 
and Overcoming Barriers via Public-Private Partnerships (n.d.) (unpublished presentation), 
available at 
http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/thedl.cfm?filename=/CL320041/relatedresources/03-NL-
NSTIC-ABA-IdM-Mtg.pdf. 
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have now begun the process of turning the NSTIC’s Identity Ecosystem into a reality.5   
The NSTIC represents the classic intersection of two competing concepts: security and 
liberty.  Those in favor of the policy cite the rise in cybercrime, crippling cost of online fraud and 
identity theft, and need to enhance online protections as primary motivation for the program.6  
Opponents to the NSTIC, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation, are quick to highlight the 
practical and constitutional issues created by an Identity Ecosystem.7  
This article takes the position that the NSTIC, as it currently exists, does not pierce the 
constitutional veil.  Moreover, the practical evolution of the Identity Ecosystem will likely 
remain clear of the constitution as well.  Opponents of the NSTIC misunderstand the current 
state of the policy and go too far in their predictions of the future.  This position is not taken 
lightly, however, and emphasizes the need for enhanced legislation to defend against the 
legitimate concerns raised by privacy advocates.  As misguided as their assessment of the NSTIC 
might be, the influence of the program’s opponents is exactly what is needed to keep the Identity 
Ecosystem in proper balance.    
                                                 
5 Tim Sampson, Michigan and Pennsylvania Become First States to Test Universal Internet IDs, 
DAILY DOT (May 6, 2014), http://www.dailydot.com/news/government-michigan-pennsylvania-
test-internet-ids/; see also John Breeden II, NSTIC Is Moving Forward, but Does It Even Have a 
Chance?, FEDSCOOP (Sep. 18, 2014, 10:18 PM), http://fedscoop.com/will-government-password-
consolidation-lead-increased-security/ (discussing development of a pilot program within the 
Department of Veterans Affairs). 
6 See generally OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR TRUSTED IDENTITIES IN 
CYBERSPACE (Apr. 2011) [hereinafter NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR TRUSTED IDENTITIES IN 
CYBERSPACE], available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/NSTICstrategy_041511.pdf. 
7 See, e.g., Meghan Neal, The White House Wants to Issue You an Online ID, MOTHERBOARD 
(Apr. 28, 2014), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-white-house-wants-to-issue-you-an-
online-id. 
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II.  Evolution of the Identity Ecosystem   
   From social media to online shopping to banking, the internet provides tools for nearly 
every facet of daily life.  As internet technology has increased, so has the rise in online 
participation.  Between 2000 and 2014, the number of internet users across the globe increased 
by over 676%.8  By 2014, approximately three billion people (39% of the world’s population) 
used the internet worldwide.9  The internet has become a vital tool for operating in an 
increasingly technological world.  Americans alone spend an average of more than four hours 
online each day.10  Unfortunately, with the rise in cyber technology has comes an exponential 
growth in cyber-related crimes.  The NSTIC represents an evolution of federal policy developed 
over the past decade in response to this ever-increasing cyber threat.  However, before one may 
discuss the existing state of policy, it is important to first understand its origins.  
A. The 2003 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace  
To combat the rise in cyber incidents, President George W. Bush initiated the National 
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace in 2003.11  As recognized by the President, “In the past few years, 
threats in cyberspace have risen dramatically.”12  Therefore, “improving our ability to respond to 
cyber incidents and reduce the potential damage from such events” represented a fundamental 
and ever-increasing national security concern.13  Among several notable aspects of the National 
                                                 
8 Id. 
9 Internet Usage Statistics: The Internet Big Picture, INTERNET WORLD STATS, 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited May 5, 2015). 
10 Chip Babcock, Let’s Stop Giving the FCC Free Rein to Regulate the Internet, FORBES (May 5, 
2014, 9:59 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/05/05/lets-stop-giving-the-fcc-free-
rein-to-regulate-the-internet/. 
11 OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE (Feb. 2003), 
available at http://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cyberspace_strategy.pdf. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
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Strategy of Secure Cyberspace, the policy recognized that protecting the nation from cyber-
threats required more than government involvement.  “Securing cyberspace is an extraordinarily 
difficult strategic challenge that requires a coordinated and focused effort from our entire society 
– the federal government, state and local governments, the private sector, and the American 
people.”14  Whether President Bush realized it at the time, this announcement set the long-term 
stage for a public-private Identity Ecosystem on the internet.   
B. Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12 (HSPD-12)  
As a first-wave defense to the exploding cyber threat, President Bush focused on 
strengthening the electronic systems of the federal government.  At the time, many of the federal 
agencies maintained differing security and authentication requirements for systems and 
personnel.15  In addition to being asynchronous across federal agencies, employee authentication 
systems simply required use of a single password,16 a security approach long identified by 
experts as an “inadequate” protective measure.17  As a result of the “[w]ide variations in the 
quality and security of identification used to gain access to secure facilities,” President Bush 
released Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12 in 2004.18  Within this directive, the 
President ordered creation of a “Government-wide standard for secure and reliable forms of 
identification issued by the Federal Government to its employees and contractors (including 
contractor employees).”19   
                                                 
14 Id.  
15 See generally NSTIC, supra note 2 (author also relies, in part, on his personal knowledge of 
inter-agency security operations). 
16 Id. 
17 Wood, supra note 1. 
18 Office of the White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directiv-12 (Aug. 27, 2004), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-presidential-directive-12. 
19 Id. 
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This push for a uniform federal identification and authentication standard led to the 
creation of the Common Access Card (CAC).20  The CAC remains the standard identification 
card used by federal employees throughout the government today.21  Roughly the size of a credit 
card, the CAC includes multiple external employee identifiers such as the picture, name, rank (if 
applicable), service/agency, and specific affiliation of the specific federal employee.22  In 
addition to more commonly used identifiers, the CAC possesses “smart card” technology 
through an embedded microchip (with encryption technology), magnetic strip, and barcode that 
store data unique to each user.23  As a result, this single card provides access to secure locations 
in the physical and cyber domains across the spectrum of federal agencies.24 
Utilization of the CAC, as a singular identity tool for physical and virtual environments, 
goes far beyond simple access to the federal computer system.  As a practical example of the 
new identification system’s benefits, consider the “Air Force Portal.”25  Air Force personnel 
utilize “the portal” as the primary link to many electronic systems used by service members, 
including military pay, military leave, emergency notification records, personnel documents, and 
Department of Defense email.26  Prior to creation of the CAC, each of these systems required 
separate registration and authentication requirements, making operation in the Air Force cyber 
domain complex and cumbersome.  Implementation of the CAC linked all systems to the single 
                                                 
20 See generally NSTIC, supra note 2 (author also relies, in part, on his personal knowledge of 
inter-agency security operations). 
21 The author relies heavily on his personal experience as a federal employee when discussing 
federal agency security technology and use of the CAC system. 
22 Common Access Card (CAC) Security, DOD CAC, http://www.cac.mil/common-access-
card/cac-security (last visited Oct. 29, 2014). 
23 Id. 
24 See supra note 21. 
25 See supra note 21. 
26 See supra note 21. 
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authentication tool.  Rather than maintain numerous separate accounts, access to all network sites 
now required a simple, two-step authentication process: 1) physical insertion of the CAC into a 
digital reader and 2) a unique PIN code specifically linked to the CAC.27  The impact of these 
cybersecurity changes was clear.  Not only did this new authentication system drastically 
increase efficiency and operability,28 “DoD [Department of Defense] network intrusions fell 46% 
after it banned passwords for log-on and instead mandated use of the CAC. . . .”29  As a result of 
its successes using the CAC card, the NSTIC highlights the DoD as an entity “leading the way” 
to further implementation of enhanced authentication technology.30 
C. National Security Presidential Directive-54 (NSPD-54) 
Presumably resulting from the success of previous efforts at the federal level, President 
Bush implemented National Security Presidential Directive-54 (NSPD-54) in January 2008.31  
Focused on protecting our nation’s public and private infrastructure, NSPD-54 provided a vision 
to enhance digital identification and authentication requirements throughout the country in order 
to “improve the Nation’s security against the full spectrum of cyber threats. . . .”32  As noted by 
the President within this directive: 
Cyber criminals are intent on malicious activity, including the manipulation of 
stock prices, on-line extortion, and fraud.  These activities cost American citizens 
and businesses tens of billions of dollars each year.  Hackers and insiders have 
penetrated or shut down utilities in countries on at least three continents.  Some 
                                                 
27 See supra note 21. 
28 See supra note 21. 
29 Lefkovitz, supra note 4. 
30 Id. 
31 See generally Senate Cybersecurity Information Sharing Bill Proposed, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY 
INFO. CENTER (Jun. 20, 2014), http://epic.org/2014/06/senate-cybersecurity-informati.html. 
Error! Bookmark not defined. 
32 Office of the White House, National Security Presidential Directive-54, at 1 (Jan. 8, 2008), 
available at http://epic.org/privacy/cybersecurity/EPIC-FOIA-NSPD54.pdf. 
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terrorist groups have established sophisticated on-line presences and may be 
developing cyber attacks against the United States.33 
 
Unlike HSPD-12, which focused on securing the federal system, this initiative appeared 
to take the first steps toward expanding its security policy into the private sector.  Additionally, 
as noted by the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), this directive reveals “the 
government’s long-standing interest in enlisting private sector companies to monitor user 
activity.”34   
D. The 2009 Cyberspace Policy Review 
After the election of President Barak Obama, the White House returned once more to its 
cyber policy, publishing the Cyberspace Policy Review on May 29, 2009.35  Designed as a “60-
day, comprehensive, ‘clean-slate’ review to assess U.S. policies and structures for 
cybersecurity,”36 President Obama provided the following vision: 
The Federal government - in collaboration with industry and the civil liberties and 
privacy communities - should build a cyber-security-based identity management 
vision and strategy for the Nation that considers an array of approaches, including 
privacy-enhancing technologies. The Federal government must interact with 
citizens through myriad information, services, and benefit programs and thus has 
an interest in the protection of the public's private information as well.37   
 
While couched as a simple review process, the Cyberspace Policy Review, in its 
verbiage, seems to advocate and build upon previous White House efforts to create a more secure 
online environment for all Americans.  One privacy organization defines the Cyberspace Policy 
                                                 
33 Id. at 2. 
34 Senate Cybersecurity Information Sharing Bill Proposed, supra note 31.  
35 OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE, CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW (May 29, 2009), available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf 
[hereinafter CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW].. 
36 Id. at iii. 
37 Id. at 33.  
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Review as creating a “national plan for a public secure Internet identification program.”38  While 
taking a bold move toward greater online security for all Americans, President Obama correctly 
identified the conflict between privacy and security that provides the foundational issue within 
this article.  In advocating concern for the latter, the President makes his position clear: “People 
cannot value security without first understanding how much is at risk.”39  This continued push 
for enhanced internet security led to the creation of the NSTIC.  
E. The National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC) 
Two years after conducting the Cyberspace Policy Review, experts within the White 
House finalized the NSTIC.40  This document serves as the implementation tool for the goals 
identified within the 2009 Cyberspace Policy Review41 and envisions an online environment 
where “[i]ndividuals and organizations utilize secure, efficient, easy-to-use, and interoperable 
identity solutions to access online services in a manner that promotes confidence, privacy, 
choice, and innovation.”42  Achievement of this vision comes through “the user-centric 
‘Identity Ecosystem,’ an online environment where individuals and organizations are able to 
trust each other because they follow agreed upon standards to obtain and authenticate their 
digital identities—and the digital identities of devices.”43  In other words, as noted by one 
columnist, “standard password protection is dead,”44 replaced with a more robust authentication 
system.   
                                                 
38 NSTIC, supra note 2. 
39 CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW, supra note 35, at iv. 
40 See NSTIC, supra note 2. 
41 Breeden, supra note 5. 
42 NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR TRUSTED IDENTITIES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 6. 
43 About NSTIC, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., http://www.nist.gov/nstic/about-
nstic.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2014). 
44 Breeden, supra note 5. 
10 
 
In developing the Identity Ecosystem, the NSTIC “consists of the participants, policies, 
processes, and technologies required for trusted identification, authentication, and authorization 
across diverse transaction types.”45  Successful implementation of the ecosystem concept may 
enhance the security of a wide array of internet exchanges, from banking to networking, by 
aiding in the ability of both participants to accurately identify the individual or entity on the 
other end of the exchange.  Conceptualizing the Identity Ecosystem may be difficult.  As a 
result, the NSTIC offers the following practical example: 
…[i]ndividuals or NPEs [non-person entities] acting within the Identity 
Ecosystem can obtain a pseudonymous or uniquely identified credential from an 
identity provider before conducting transactions online.  For higher levels of 
assurance, identity providers validate subjects’ physical identities and make sure 
that each digital identity accurately reflects the actual person or NPE.  Next, 
identity providers associate a subject’s credential with the subject’s digital 
identity. . . .  A subject obtains a validated attribute claim to use in online 
transactions. . . . .  [T]he individual or NPE presents credentials and attributes 
directly to the relying party.  The subject uses privacy-enhancing technologies to 
minimize the information that is revealed to the relying party.  The relying party 
can then validate the credentials and attributes without the need for the identity or 
attribute providers to know that the subject is performing the transaction. . . .  
Relying parties are able to authenticate that the credentials and attributes are from 
valid providers and are current.  A subject supplies validated credentials and 
attribute claims to a relying party to authorize an online transaction.  Likewise, an 
individual or NPE is able to make informed choices about relying parties by 
checking whether or not the relying party has a “trustmark,” which certifies that it 
adheres to the rules of the Identity Ecosystem.  When the individual accesses the 
online services of the relying party, the trustmark is electronically validated.46      
  
The Identity Ecosystem will not rely on government sources to maintain identity and 
authentication databases.  Rather, the NSTIC envisions use of public-private partnerships.47  In 
January 2011, Commerce Secretary Gary Locke announced that the NIST “would be responsible 
for the digital identity framework;” however, “implementation would be outsourced to the 
                                                 
45 NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR TRUSTED IDENTITIES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 6. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
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private market, eliminating the need for a central database.”48  As one columnist writes, “In other 
words, private businesses, like Target, will get a shot at protecting our now singular online 
identities.”49   
Private companies offering secure authentication technology is not a new idea.  In July 
2008, Facebook unveiled its “Connect” concept, which offered “third-party websites tools to 
coordinate with the user information that Facebook holds, including logins.”50  As a result, 
“websites had the option of allowing Facebook users to identify themselves with their Facebook 
identities.”51  The government may look to other companies, such as Google and PayPal, to 
provide the necessary technology as well.52  As early as 2008, a conglomerate of companies 
including AT&T, Google, PayPal, Symantec and Verizon created the “Open Identity Exchange,” 
a concept designed to “develop certification standards for online identity authentication.”53  
Other companies like ApplePay and the Smart Card Alliance also appear eager to participate.54   
Since its development in 2011, the NSTIC has transitioned from the theoretical to the 
practical.  In the fall of 2013, the NIST awarded a total of $2.4 million in grants to Minnesota 
and Pennsylvania for implementation of the first pilot programs.55  As of the summer of 2014, 
                                                 
48 NSTIC, supra note 2. 
49 David Anderson, Internet Driver’s License, RICHFIELD REAPER (Jun. 11, 2014, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.richfieldreaper.com/opinion/columnists/columnist_one/article_c59c3898-db7f-11e3-
967f-0019bb2963f4.html. 
50 Simson Garfinkel, Facebook Wants to Supply Your Internet Driver’s License, MIT TECH. REV. 
(Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/422285/facebook-wants-to-supply-your-
internet-drivers-license/. 
51 Id. 
52 Singer, supra note 3. 
53 Id. 
54 See Breeden, supra note 5; see also Smart Card Alliance Endorses the NSTIC Framework, 
SMART CARD ALLIANCE, http://www.smartcardalliance.org/publications-smart-card-alliance-
endorses-the-nstic-framework/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2014). 
55 Wood, supra note 1. 
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these programs were underway.56  Rather than create entirely new authentication systems out of 
whole cloth “or even some form of comprehensive Internet wide identification system, the 
implementations in each state look at how existing systems can be used to simplify 
authentication across departments.”57  For the moment, these programs appear focused on 
creating authentication systems for users working with government agencies at the state and 
local levels.58  Specifically, Pennsylvania is “developing an implementation that would allow 
users to operate a single identity across state departments, rather than requiring users to manage 
usernames and passwords for each department, which is the case today.”59  
In addition to state-based initiatives, the federal government launched its own pilot 
program with the Department of Veterans Affairs.60  Similar to the existing authentication 
currently used by companies such as PayPal,61 the federal ecosystem looks to establish an 
identification and authentication system for citizen interaction with the federal government 
through a singular website known as Connect.gov.62  Though unclear at this point, this website 
may offer a singular point of entry for access to various federal agencies similar to the Air Force 
Portal concept discussed above.  Depending on its success, additional federal agencies may 
                                                 
56 See, e.g., Sampson, supra note 5.  
57 Wood, supra note 1. 
58 See generally id.  
59 Id. 
60 See Breeden, supra note 5. 
61 See generally id. 
62 See Aliya Sternstein, Exclusive: New Connect.Gov Aims to Consolidate Your Passwords, 
NEXTGOV (Sep. 15, 2014), http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2014/09/new-connectgov-
aims-consolidate-your-passwords/94154. 
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join.63  Development of the Identity Ecosystem remains in its infancy stage; however, a fully 
developed online ecosystem may emerge as early as 2020.64   
  Despite the program’s current focus on government-based systems, the transition to e-
commerce and other private markets will certainly follow.  As envisioned by the NSTIC, 
“Imagine a world where individuals can conduct sensitive business transactions online with 
reduced fear of identity theft or fraud and without the need to manage scores of usernames and 
passwords.”65  The transition strategy provided by the NSTIC makes clear its wide-reaching 
intent by providing the following series of goals: 1) develop and strengthen the Identity 
Ecosystem; 2) implement the ecosystem at the local/state/federal levels; 3) enhance consumer 
confidence in the Identity Ecosystem through “education and awareness” measures, thereby 
promoting “widespread adoption of the Identity Ecosystem” in the United States; and finally 4) 
ensure “long-term success” of the program with an eye toward “integrat[ing] the Identity 
Ecosystem internationally.”66  As noted by the NSTIC, “The greater number of participants in 
the Identity Ecosystem, the greater the value that each will obtain from participation.”67     
It is important to emphasize that the NSTIC calls for purely volunteer participation.68  
Much of the implementation strategy focuses, not on compelling cooperation, but educating the 
populace regarding the benefits of participating in a secure Identity Ecosystem.69   However, 
despite the seemingly innocuous development of the NSTIC, its implications are, as stated within 
                                                 
63 See Breeden, supra note 5. 
64 Id. 
65 NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR TRUSTED IDENTITIES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 6. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. (citing the third goal of the NSTIC). 
68 Id. (stating that the first of the NSTIC’s “guiding principles” is to ensure that “[i]dentity 
solutions will be privacy-enhancing and voluntary”). 
69 See id. 
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the NSTIC, “widespread.”70  It is clear that the NSTIC seeks nothing less than to revolutionize 
the internet.  If the NSTIC achieves is goals, “it could pave the way for an interoperable 
authentication protocol that works for any website, from your Facebook account to your health 
insurance company.”71  And yet, surprisingly, its implementation has received little public 
attention.  Rather than remain in the dark, the remainder of this article sheds light on this 
important topic, focusing next on the “pros” and “cons” of the NSTIC. 
III.  The Pros 
 The online environment represents a virtually endless road of opportunity, innovation, 
and advancement.  However, despite the plethora of positive attributes associated with the 
internet, challenges have emerged in the decades of electronic advancement.  The internet has 
saved and ruined lives.  Many have pushed for greater internet control, a reining in of the 
worldwide web for the overall benefit of mankind.72  This section seeks to identify and discuss 
the primary advantages of the NSTIC.      
A. Reduction in Cyber Crime 
There is no doubt: cybercrime is big business.  As of 2006, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation estimated that cybercrime cost United States businesses $67.2 billion.73  Average 
costs per company reached approximately $24 thousand.74  Examples of the pervasiveness of 
cybercrime may be seen at the local level as well.  For example, of 1600 Miami businesses 
                                                 
70  Id. 
71 Neal, supra note 7. 
72 See generally Ryan Singel, Desperate Botnet Battlers Call for an Internet Driver’s License, 
WIRED (Jun. 4, 2007), http://archive.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/06/bot_strategy. 
73 Joris Evers, Computer Crime Costs $67 Billion, FBI Says, CNET NEWS (Jan. 19, 2006, 2:20 
PM), http://news.cnet.com/Computer-crime-costs-67-billion,-FBI-says/2100-7349_3-
6028946.html. 
74 Id. 
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visited by federal agents in 2007 “that had billed for ‘durable medical equipment’ . . . 481 . . . 
didn’t even exist, accounting for $237 million of fraud in just one year.”75  A quarter of a billion 
dollars, in one city, in a single year.  And this only represents health care fraud. 
Not only does cybercrime have devastating effect on businesses but individuals as well.  
As of 2004, according to a Javelin Strategy & Research study, identity fraud cost American 
citizens $52.6 billion.76  According to cybersecurity firm McAffee, “37,413 new malicious 
programs hit the internet last year, including exploit code and bots.”77  This equates to 
development and release of one new computer virus roughly every fifteen minutes.  As a result, 
citizens and businesses alike face the enormous challenge of protecting their electronic systems 
from cyber-attacks on a minute-by-minute basis.  Such invasions can result in devastating loss to 
both person and purse.              
As noted in its policy declaration, combating cybercrime lies at the heart of the NSTIC: 
The Nation faces a host of increasingly sophisticated threats to the personal, 
sensitive, financial, and confidential information of organizations and individuals.  
Fraudulent transactions within the banking, retail, and other sectors–along with 
online intrusions into the Nation’s critical infrastructure, such as electric utilities–
are all too common.  As more commercial and government services become 
available online, the amount of sensitive information transmitted over the Internet 
will increase.  Consequently, the probability of loss associated with data theft, 
unauthorized modifications, fraud, and privacy breaches will also increase.  
Although the total amount of losses–both financial and non-financial–due to 
online fraud and cybercrime is difficult to quantify, the problem is real and it is 
increasing.78 
 
                                                 
75 Wood, supra note 1. 
76 Evers, supra note 73. 
77 Singel, supra note 72. 
78 NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR TRUSTED IDENTITIES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 6 (citing 2009 
Internet Crime Report, INTERNET CRIME COMPLAINT CENTER (IC3) (Mar. 12, 2010), 
http://www.ic3.gov/media/annualreport/2009_IC3Report.pdf.) 
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 The NSTIC approaches this threat head-on by pushing implementation of a more secure 
internet environment through the Identity Ecosystem.  Providing internet users a more secure 
option that utilizes enhanced security and authentication technology when operating in the cyber 
realm has the potential to significantly decrease the staggering statistics associated with 
cybercrime.  The possible benefits are not merely hypothetical; entities that currently use such 
enhanced security techniques have seen a marked decrease in cyber-attacks.  On the federal side, 
as noted above, enhanced security within the Department of Defense resulted in a 46% decrease 
in network intrusions.79  In the private sector, PayPal’s robust authentication requirements, 
“using the handoff type password technology proposed by the NSTIC,” have resulted in greater 
security without, to the author’s knowledge, ever suffering from a mass-data hack.80   
 As internet technology becomes more sophisticated, so do the criminals.  Cyber-attacks 
and cyber-crime increase each year, with little response to the mounting threat.  Technology 
requirements proposed by the NSTIC have the ability to drastically deter cybercrime, making our 
nation’s citizens, businesses, and infrastructure more secure.   
B. Economic Gain  
Providing a secure option for online data exchanges, both public and private, has the 
potential to reduce government expenditures and enhance overall economic prosperity.  Turning 
first to the public domain, on-line authentication systems significantly decrease the 
administrative cost of providing government services to its citizens.  In Florida, for example, the 
Department of Children and Families implemented a robust on-line authentication tool that cost 
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taxpayers $3 million.81  This electronic program allowed for greater on-line exchange, thereby 
reducing overall personnel demands and saving taxpayers $14.7 million.82  “The DCF says the 
technology is saving so much money because it saves staff the time of verifying identities 
manually, and even better, there’s been a reduction in cases of identity fraud.”83  Implementation 
of like programs across the government spectrum could significantly decrease overall 
government expenditures, potentially saving taxpayers billions of dollars while simultaneously 
reducing incidents of fraud.      
Economic benefits are not limited to government cost savings.  Enhanced authentication 
and security requirements online have the potential to significantly increase profitability of 
companies engaged in e-commerce.  Providing citizens and businesses with an option to operate 
in a more secure online environment benefits both sides of the exchange.  The Identity 
Ecosystem allows a consumer to identify the business as an authenticated entity, while the 
company may identify the individual on the other end of the exchange as a legitimate consumer.  
This level of security increases the visibility of the exchange while reducing fraud at both ends, 
thus yielding an increased trust in online purchasing and greater participation in the e-commerce 
realm.  More easily put, “If people have a simple, easy way to prove who they are online with 
more than a flimsy password, they’ll naturally do more business on the web.”84 
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 According to one senior policy advisor, retail sales online are projected to reach $2 
trillion in 2016.85  Enhanced consumer trust during online exchanges could result in a $500 
billion increase to total sales.86  Regardless of whether these figures provide accurate commercial 
predictions, the study provides statistical support to an obvious conclusion: trust matters when it 
comes to online transactions.87   
Finally, reduction in online fraud and other cyber-related crime stimulates the economy.  
Even a marginal decrease in cybercrime due to enhanced security and authentication 
requirements proposed by the NSTIC would potentially save billions of dollars each year for 
private consumers and public businesses.  This additional stimulus, which would have otherwise 
been lost to crime, could promote further consumer activity and allow businesses to further 
invest in infrastructure, enhance services, and/or reduce consumer prices.  Securing the online 
environment has potential to save significant taxpayer dollars while providing economic security, 
stability, and prosperity. 
C. Convenience and Efficiency 
Nobody likes waiting in line at the DMV. 88  It is a dreaded trip citizens make each year, 
and it is just one example of the often time-consuming and frustrating trips made by individuals 
to local, state, and federal agencies.  As one columnist writes, “What if states had a better way to 
authenticate your identity online, so that you didn’t have to make a trip to the DMV?”89  
                                                 
85 Lefkovitz, supra note 4 (citing Rethinking Personal Data: Strengthening Trust, WORLD ECON. 
FORUM (May 2012), http://www.weforum.org/reports/rethinking-personal-data-strengthening-
trust). 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 See Singer, supra note 3.  
89 Id. 
19 
 
Enhanced identification and authentication technology reduces the need for many of these 
dreaded experiences.   
Members of the Armed Forces enjoy the convenience and efficiency of enhanced identity 
and authentication technology utilized by the Department of Defense.  Prior to implementation of 
the CAC card, as previously detailed above, exchanges within the online federal system were 
often time-consuming and cumbersome.  The myriad systems utilized by the federal government 
tended to overwhelm incoming personnel.  Access to military pay, military leave, personnel 
records, emergency locator data, and physical fitness reporting (just to name a few) each required 
separate user names and passwords.  This often led to either forgotten information (which 
required the additional time of re-creating verification data) or a laundry list user names and 
passwords written on a hidden sheet of paper (which created a significant security risk).  
Moreover, lack of enhanced security resulted in frequent breaches, yielding loss of private data.   
The introduction of the CAC system eliminated much of these concerns.  Now, the 
verification and authentication data imbedded within the CAC card provides a singular source 
for access to all online systems.  Rather than create individual user names and passwords, the 
system merely requires insertion of the CAC card, with imbedded authentication, and a singular 
user password.  Moreover, the differing systems are now interoperable, leading to more fluid and 
secure online operation.   
While the NSTIC design does not propose a physical identification card such as the CAC, 
nor will such a system likely result from the NSTIC, a singular online identity for operations 
within the Identity Ecosystem does provide a level of convenience currently unknown to citizens.  
Not only would a similar system save significant time on-line, enhanced identity and 
authentication technology likely eliminates the need for travel to business or government 
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agencies for identification verification.  Trips that once took half a day may now be 
accomplished in minutes from the comfort of one’s home – thus alleviating the headache that 
often comes with a trip to the DMV.   
IV.  The Cons 
Despite the benefits that may come with the Identity Ecosystem, one cannot ignore the 
many legal and practical challenges presented by this program.  Of the little discussion currently 
devoted to this issue, the large majority appears to stand in opposition to the NSTIC, fervently 
declaring the beginning to the end of freedom on the internet.  While the program remains in its 
infancy, one need not look too far into the future nor strain their imagination too great to 
understand the potential concerns underlying this program.  This section provides a basic 
understanding of the negative aspects of the NSTIC.    
A. Privacy 
Ironically, the NSTIC sites “privacy” as among the first of its guiding principles.90  But 
this internal declaration has not fooled privacy advocates.  Opponents to the NSTIC fiercely 
assert that creating a singular online identity destroys rather than protects privacy.91  The 
Electronic Frontier Foundation labels the proposed Identity Ecosystem as “radical” and an 
“unprecedented threat . . . to privacy . . . online.”92       
Neither the United States Constitution nor the Bill of Rights specifically mentions a right 
to privacy.  This legal concept remained virtually unspoken for over a century after our nation’s 
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inception until a young Louis Brandeis crafted an argument for constitutional privacy in 1890.93  
Some twenty-six years before attaining the status of Supreme Court Justice, Mr. Brandeis most 
simply referred to the idea as “the right to be let alone.”94  Since that time, the doctrine has 
emerged at various moments in our nation’s legal history.   
The Supreme Court’s initial discussion of a citizen’s general right to privacy emerged 
with the rise in technology as it related to criminal law and procedure.95  As observed by the 
Court, “Discovery and invention have made it possible for the Government, by means far more 
effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the 
closet.”96  Even prior to declaring a constitutional right to privacy, the Court continued to assert a 
certain level of privacy within the criminal realm.97  Since that time, privacy rights have been 
repeatedly asserted by the Court in this area of law.98  However, the Court’s declared 
                                                 
93 See Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, Note, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890); see also Tim Sharp, Right to Privacy: Constitutional Rights & Privacy Laws, LIVE SCI. 
(Jun. 12, 2013, 5:34 PM), http://www.livescience.com/37398-right-to-privacy.html. 
94 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 93, at 193. 
95 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (regarding law enforcement’s investigatory 
use of warrantless wiretapping). 
96 Id. at 474 (upholding the use of warrantless wiretapping).  Despite the privacy concerns rising 
from the development of technology, the Court’s precedent in Olmstead remained intact for 
nearly forty years until its reversal in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
97  In Mapp v. Ohio, for example, the Court declared that 
without [the exclusionary rule], the freedom from state invasions of privacy 
would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the 
freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court’s 
high regard as a freedom ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. 
367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
98 The Court continues to assert its Katz analysis today.  As recently recognized by the Court, 
“Our later cases have applied the analysis of Justice Harlan's concurrence in that case, which said 
that a violation occurs when government officers violate a person's ‘reasonable expectation of 
privacy.’” United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 360). 
22 
 
constitutional right to privacy was not forged from criminal procedure, but rather, marital law.99  
Over the decades since Griswold, additional rights to privacy have been added to the list.100  As a 
result, though not specifically enumerated or universally declared, the Supreme Court continues 
to assert and expand upon an individual’s right to privacy.  How this right extends to the internet, 
however, remains undefined.   
On a practical level, some technology experts “foresee challenges in instituting across-
the-board privacy protections for consumers and companies.”101  For example, a singular, 
authenticated identity streamlines tracking and data collection of the user, allowing “trusted” 
companies within the Identity Ecosystem to amass and share data regarding every aspect of one’s 
online behavior.102  Interoperability requirements of systems linked to the ecosystem create 
further privacy concern.  Stated by one critic:  
[P]eople may not want the banks they might use as their authenticators to know 
which government sites they visit. . . .  Banks, meanwhile, may not want their 
rivals to have access to data profiles about their clients.  But both situations could 
arise if identity authenticators assigned each user with an individual name, 
number, e-mail address or code, allowing companies to follow people around the 
Web and amass detailed profiles on their transactions.103  
  
As Lillie Coney, associate director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, bluntly 
puts it, “Look at it this way: You can have one key that opens every lock for everything you 
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might need online in your daily life [Identity Ecosystem] . . . [o]r, would you rather have a key 
ring that would allow you to open some things but not others?”104    
Despite NSTIC’s attempts at ensuring privacy, the program cannot avoid the perception 
of enhanced online monitoring at the hands of the federal government.  The timing of the 
program’s roll-out alone generates concern.  As noted by one columnist, “At a time when 
Americans are more reticent to trust the government with their online information than ever 
before, officials are finally moving forward with plans for a universal online ID.”105  Continued 
disclosure of federal action through notorious whistleblower Edward Snowden simply creates an 
ominous feel to this program and enhances concerns for what the future of the Identity 
Ecosystem may bring.  As a result, perhaps the best argument on behalf of privacy advocates is 
less defined.  Rather than focus on specific practical or theoretical concerns, the opposition may 
be best suited to emphasize the perceived intrusion of the federal government into their daily 
lives on the internet.  An individual who once enjoyed the freedom to move within cyberspace 
uninhibited by governmental restraint may feel their world slipping away.  To some, this extent 
of federal control may feel closer to government intrusion than regulation.  Thus, privacy 
advocates may be compelled to harken a return of Justice Brandeis’s original argument for a 
citizen’s constitutional right to privacy: when it comes to the internet, just leave me alone.106 
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B. Freedom of Speech 
One the most fundamental guarantees of liberty within our nation is the freedom of 
speech.  It is first in our Bill of Rights; it represents who we are as a nation of free people.107  As 
Justice Brandeis eloquently stated in Whitney v. California regarding the value of free 
expression:  
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to 
make men free to develop their faculties . . . .  They believed that freedom to think 
as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery 
and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion 
would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection 
against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom 
is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be 
a fundamental principle of the American government.108    
 
One of the greatest attributes of the internet is the ability to exchange information and 
share differing viewpoints with others.  A vast amount of this internet expression is political in 
nature.  Such communication is vital to the health of our nation, providing a certain additional 
“check” within our political system.  As a result, the internet has for decades been a primary 
means of upholding this “fundamental principle of American government.”109  
Due to the nature of some speech, particularly that speech which encourages “discovery 
and spread of political truth,”110 individuals may prefer expression be done in private and with 
the benefit of anonymity.  People often feel emboldened to speak loudly and in truth when it is 
                                                 
107 U.S. CONST. amend. I  (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.”) 
108 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
25 
 
done in the shadows.  Anonymous expression is implicit within the context of free speech.111  
Previous attempts by government actors to “unmask” those who have chosen to anonymously 
speak out have been swiftly shot down by the Supreme Court112 primarily based upon the 
recognition that “identification and fear of reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of 
public matters of importance.”113   
Among the concerns of the NSTIC is the potential chilling effect that a singular online 
identity would have on free and anonymous speech within the internet.  A universal, online 
identification scheme appears to shed light on expression that the Supreme Court has demanded 
be left in the dark.  As Justice Sotomayor noted in a recent case involving the rise in GPS 
technology, “Awareness that the Government may be watching chills associational and 
expressive freedoms.”114  Although the Court in Jones grappled with the privacy rights of 
individuals as it related to use of GPS tracking systems,115 the principle concerns apply to this 
setting as well.  
Requiring an online identity for exchanges over the internet may be seen as one giant 
leap towards impermissible government oversight of private communications and conduct.  In 
reading the NSTIC plan, it is difficult to escape the overall feeling that, to some degree, “big 
brother” will be watching.116  Whether the threat is actual or, more likely, imagined does not 
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remove the concerns associated with “chilling” the ability for people to speak their mind.  Either 
way, there exists a real potential to stifle legitimate and important online communication. 
C. Freedom of Association 
For reasons similar to the freedom of speech, the NSTIC may serve to suppress the 
freedom of association as well.  Ever since the State of Alabama attempted to compel production 
of private NAACP membership lists in the 1950s, the Court has recognized a constitutional right 
to certain private association.117  “It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for 
the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”118  
Additionally, as the Court noted, there is a “vital relationship between freedom to associate and 
privacy in one’s associations.”119  Failure to respect the right to private association, especially 
when that association touches on sensitive or controversial issues, may infringe upon the right.  
In short, open association on certain matters may result in no association at all. 
Similar to the problems related to freedom of speech, a singular online identity that 
specifically identifies the user may infringe upon a person’s right to anonymous association.  
Individuals who wish to remain anonymous in their online participation with certain groups may 
find themselves compelled to disclose their identity in order to continue their association with the 
group.  The problem exponentially increases with the threat that one’s identity may be revealed, 
not only to other group member, but outside entities across the internet.  As with the freedom of 
speech, whether the eyes of “big brother”120 are watching or not does not end the concern; any 
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fear created by a singular online identity that deters an individual from exercising their right to 
free association is also problematic.   
D. Practical Problems 
Beyond the constitutional issues exist a plethora of practical concerns with implementing 
the NSTIC.  First, the singular nature of the identity is, in itself, highly problematic.121  By 
providing a singular identity maintained by an external source, the NSTIC creates a single point 
of failure.  The lack of redundancy creates a serious problem.  One columnist defines this as 
“putting all your security eggs in one vulnerable basket.”  Simply put, “If a hacker gets their 
hands on your cyber ID, they have the keys to everything.”122   
Advocates of the NSTIC may be quick to note the success of secure systems such as 
PayPal and the inherent added security that would come in the creation of the identity.  Note 
once more that PayPal has not suffered a mass hack.123  However, one could argue that it is only 
a matter of time.  And, with the NSTIC’s approach, it would only take one time to significantly 
harm a user.  A massive breach of an identity databank would result in full online control of any 
individual or company whose data has been entrusted to the particular holder.  At the moment, 
users are able to mitigate the damage of online attacks by diversifying their identities across the 
internet spectrum.  A breach of a single source, on the other hand, would allow virtual access to 
every aspect of a user’s life.  The damage would simply be catastrophic.   
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Second, in the same vein as above, the consolidation of all aspects of an internet user’s 
activities makes mass data an even greater threat to a user’s online privacy.124  This singular flow 
of information “could mean that everything said under that particular NSTIC holder's account—
from ‘I really like that movie’ to ‘I disagree with our government’, with the particulars to be 
supplied as needed—could be traced back to one user.”125  Aside from the constitutional 
implications, “such a repository of useful information would not only be prime hunting ground 
for hackers, but corporations would pay fortunes for access to such data.”126   
Third, while the NSTIC’s long-term vision includes a worldwide online security system, 
the short-term gain may be seen as negligible.  If everyone does not participate, the security 
ideals proposed by NSTIC do not eliminate the problem.  Cyber-criminals and identity thieves 
will still be able to participate outside the boundaries of the protected system, leaving those who 
do participate in the NSTIC vulnerable to attack.   
Fourth, if full success only comes with full cooperation, the “voluntary” nature of the 
program may be short-lived.  Perhaps this realization hits home for opponents to the NSTIC, as 
they may see the writing on the wall.  For example, online companies who adopt the NSTIC 
model may eventually demand consumers also participate in order to ensure greater 
transparency, and less fraud, within the online exchange process.  Government agencies that 
realize the cost savings that comes with online participation may turn to a fully automated 
process and eventually demand citizens’ registration.  As a result, individuals who would wish to 
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avoid an internet identity may find themselves forced into cooperation.  This implied coercion 
adds greater depth to the constitutional concerns discussed above.   
Fifth, the NSTIC envisions privatizing storage databanks rather than keeping such 
sensitive information under government control.127  While it seems Uncle Sam intends this as a 
means to eliminate the problematic “big brother” perception and harness private sector 
innovation,128 this approach creates other concerns.129  Public-private partnerships are 
commonplace in government contracting130 and often provide synergistic effect.  Advocates of 
the identity system may point to the user’s ability within the NSTIC to “choose among multiple 
identity providers and digital credentials” as a means to enhance user control.131  However, no 
company is perfect, and this is not a perfect solution.  “In theory, this could give a company 
like Google or Verizon a powerful tool for accessing user data and trusting them not to misuse it 
for their own gain.”132  While companies such as Google already conduct significant data-mining 
operations, implementation of the program would further advance this controversial practice.  
Moreover, the government’s use of multiple trusted sources may require forced cooperation 
between “rival” companies, something that may prove difficult.133  While government oversight 
would undoubtedly exist, the NSTIC provides private companies with an even greater amount of 
autonomy over our daily lives.     
While an authenticated online identity provides numerous benefits, the challenges are 
loud and clear.  Creation of a singular online identity provides a face to those who would choose 
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to remain anonymous, creating constitutional concerns in the areas of privacy, speech, and 
association.  Moreover, the practical challenges with implementing such a robust online identity 
system are additionally troublesome, leading one to wonder whether bang is worth the buck.     
V.  An Argument For the NSTIC 
Though the lines have clearly been drawn, the question is not if the NSTIC will emerge 
victorious but when and to what extent.  The benefits, as proposed, are immense and mutually 
beneficial to businesses and citizens alike.  They clearly represent a compelling governmental 
interest.  Moreover, the ad campaign likely to be offered by the government in an effort to secure 
the hearts and minds of the populace is a winning one – an easy sell to an otherwise fairly 
indifferent online population.  The challenges posed by the Identity Ecosystem are concerning 
and deserve attention.  However, as it currently exists, the NSTIC is a constitutional program, 
and the practical concerns merely represent challenges to be overcome with increased effort and 
innovation.   
A. The Reality of the Identity Ecosystem 
Privacy advocates exaggerate the problems of the Identity Ecosystem, painting an overly 
grim picture of what the future holds that seems to conjure images of inserting a physical 
“Internet Driver’s License” into a computer before operating on the internet highway.134  This 
view is misguided and unrealistic.  There will be no “driver’s license,”135 nor will there be eager 
government officials watching your every move on the other end of the line.   
Unlike the Department of Defense’s use of the CAC card, the Identity Ecosystem will 
likely not result in distribution of physical hardware.  Rather, authentication and security 
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requirements will consist of multi-authentication prompts as suggested by some technology 
experts.136  The time and expense of issuing physical “licenses” far outweighs the benefits, and 
requiring citizens to do so would only fuel the fire of NSTIC opponents.  Implementation of the 
NSTIC will appear much more subtle and much less pervasive.   
The NSTIC has existed in conceptual form for several years, giving its experts plenty of 
time to develop an appropriate strategy for long-term implementation of this program.  It is clear 
they knew what they were doing.  The NSTIC seems to have addressed the majority of concerns 
at the outset by creating at least the illusion that the government provides solutions to most of the 
program’s problems.  The NSTIC is still in its infancy, leaving ample time for further innovation 
and improvement.  For now, the plan at least includes the right phraseology to mitigate the 
opposition’s arguments. 
B. Voluntary Participation 
A key factor of the NSTIC is the voluntary nature of the program.137  As designed, 
individuals and businesses will not be forced to participate.  Rather than compelled cooperation, 
the NSTIC envisions a grass-roots effort where “the public and private sector will use awareness 
and education programs to encourage demand for the Identity Ecosystem and to inform its 
use.”138  Those who wish to remain non-participants will be allowed to distance themselves from 
the ecosystem, which, as will be discussed below, lessens the constitutional concerns that come 
with forced participation.   
This introduces two possible paradigms for conceptualizing the Identity Ecosystem.  The 
ecosystem is either: 1) a complete take-over or 2) a safe haven.  Privacy advocates may view the 
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Identity Ecosystem as an attempt to forcefully take-over the entire online world.  Others may 
view it as merely offering companies and internet users the option to engage online within a safe 
haven designed to enhance online security.   
The appropriate way to view the Identity Ecosystem is through the latter paradigm.  Build 
the fortress, and invite the people in.  That is what the NSTIC seeks to accomplish.139  If 
popularity of the ecosystem increases, the safe haven may expand to greater areas of the online 
world.  Though it is possible that the Identity Ecosystem may eventually dominate a large 
spectrum of the online world, it also may not.  Companies may choose to move their business 
within the safe haven, or they may opt to remain beyond the walls.   
One problem with the expressed voluntary nature of the program, however, is the 
suggested coercive effect that greater participation may have on an individual wishing to refrain 
from joining the Identity Ecosystem.  Companies that adopt enhanced identity protocol through 
the NSTIC may require participants to do the same, leaving some with a difficult choice: 
sacrifice certain amenities for the sake of remaining anonymous on the web or give up certain 
privacy interests in order to enjoy full online participation.  This argument, however, does not 
remove from the equation the individual’s ability to choose.  They are still left with an honest 
decision that, although difficult, is fully theirs to make.  One cannot label such a situation 
coercive simply based on the user’s loss of certain internet amenities if they choose to remain 
anonymous.  The fact remains: that is their choice.   
These decisions are already commonplace in the technological realm.  Google’s 
voluminous user agreement, for example, includes terms and conditions that, if read and 
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understood, may be considered an infringement on one’s privacy.140  Earlier this year, the 
internet giant “updated its terms of service to reflect that it analyzes user content including 
emails to provide users tailored advertising, customized search results and other features.”141  
Google’s efforts to scan its users’ emails represent the exact concerns posed by opponents of the 
NSTIC.  And yet, such practices have not resulted in mass consumer migration to more protected 
email services.  In fact, Gmail exists today as “the world’s largest email service.”142  It is simply 
the cost of doing business with Google.  Those who disagree may opt to take their business 
elsewhere.  That transitioning to a different email account may prove burdensome for people 
who have used the same email for years does not alter the argument.  It is often difficult to 
change one’s business and private practices.  However, people commonly switch companies, 
such as cell phone services, when they disagree with evolving company policy.  The user still 
maintains the power of choice: accept the company’s changes or simply move on. 
If successful, it is possible the Identity Ecosystem will evolve into an involuntary system.  
The most predictable first step toward compelled participation is in the realm of government 
services.  Cost savings to local, state, and federal governments in rendering support to its citizens 
may push legislators to adopt fully online services as a means to reduce public expense.  This 
evolution does not affect the constitutionality of the program, however, especially as it relates to 
government services.  First, there can be no expectation of privacy when interacting with the 
government in areas such as filing taxes and receiving government support.  A citizen’s identity 
                                                 
140 See John Ribeiro, Google Updates Terms of Service to Reflect Its Scanning of Users’ Emails, 
PCWORLD (Apr. 14, 2014, 10:23 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2143700/google-updates-
terms-of-service-to-reflect-its-scanning-of-users-emails.html. 
141 Id. 
142 Adrian Covert, GMail at 10: How Google Dominated E-Mail, CNN MONEY (Apr. 1, 2014, 
7:01 AM EDT), http://money.cnn.com/2014/04/01/technology/gmail/index.html. 
34 
 
is a vital component to the process, and proper interaction cannot take place in anonymity.  
Second, the minimal demands of a robust online identity when interacting with the government 
does not place such an added burden on the citizen to overcome the benefit to the government in 
added cost savings and security.  Third, alternatives to online interaction will likely remain for 
those without computer access, leaving open to citizens an option to avoid the necessity of 
engaging within the Identity Ecosystem.  In time, perhaps the standards will more drastically 
change.  However, such additional changes will be measured by popular support and one’s 
understanding of the evolving internet environment.      
Market forces will ultimately drive implementation of the Identity Ecosystem.  If enough 
people demand an alternative to the Identity Ecosystem when engaging the government or 
private businesses, perhaps the momentum will change.  However, as noted below, that does not 
seem to be happening at the moment.      
C. Privacy and the People 
The Supreme Court has made clear that people enjoy certain rights to privacy.  This paper 
does not attempt to minimize or quash that inherent right as a citizen.  The right remains; it is 
real and powerful.  However, defining an individual’s right to privacy on the internet is difficult.  
The concept is amorphous and remains ill-defined.  With the exception of a few cases related to 
criminal procedure, the extent of internet privacy has been largely ignored by the Supreme 
Court.143  This leaves one to ponder what privacy rights exist in the internet realm.  Opponents to 
the NSTIC who focus on inherent internet privacy rights are relying on law that simply does not 
exist at the moment. 
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At least one Supreme Court justice has offered a reason for the Court’s silence in this 
area, and it involves the rapid change of technology.  In United States v. Jones, which involved 
law enforcement’s use of GPS technology, Justice Alito provides, “In circumstances involving 
dramatic technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative . . . .  A 
legislative body is well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to 
balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.”144  In other words, leave it to the 
people’s branch to decide where the lines should be drawn, as the Court simply cannot keep up.  
Law reflects societal standards.  It is largely up to “the people” to define those standards.   
Unfortunately for privacy advocates, “the people” currently demonstrate less interest in 
protecting privacy.  In his 1997 article Toward A Positive Theory of Privacy Law, scholar Lior 
Strahilevitz discusses the future of privacy legislation: 
American attitudes toward privacy are highly heterogeneous, with approximately 
twenty-five percent of the population valuing privacy a great deal (privacy 
fundamentalists), twenty percent of the population not valuing their own privacy 
and having a difficult time understanding why anyone would care about privacy 
(privacy unconcerned), and the remaining fifty-five percent of the population 
approaching privacy in a pragmatic way that balances competing interests 
(privacy pragmatists).  If the privacy unconcerned are indeed more disposed to 
participate heavily in the political process, with privacy fundamentalists tending 
to remain on the sidelines in political debates, the smaller group's voice in policy 
debates may be just as loud or even louder than the larger cohort's.145 
 
While these statistics offer a solid statistical foundation, two additional factors have 
emerged since this article’s publication that further support the overall argument.  First, the rise 
in internet technology has likely increased the number of individuals identified as “privacy 
unconcerned.”  Behavior on social media forums suggest that the walls built around our daily 
lives are shrinking, voluntarily.  As Pew Research reports, 74% of adult internet users participate 
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in social networking sites.146  Approximately 1.23 billion people have Facebook accounts 
worldwide, and 556 million of those users access the website every day.147  The world enjoys 
unprecedented interconnectivity at the click of a button.  People share information daily – often 
intimate details about their lives, discussion of which may have once been considered taboo.  
Though unsupported by statistics, younger generations who have grown up in the internet age 
likely view privacy much different than older generations.  This proposed evolution of privacy 
may increase the number of those considered “privacy unconcerned.”   
A recent study by the Pew Research Internet Project seems to generally confirm this 
hypothesis.  From a survey sample 607 adults of wide-ranging ages, a large majority expressed 
significant concerns related to privacy on the internet.148  Of those surveyed, 91% selected either 
“strongly agree” or “agree” to the statement “consumers have lost control over how personal 
information is collected and used by companies.”149  Of those surveyed that subscribe to social 
networking sites, 80% “say they are concerned about third parties like advertisers or businesses 
accessing the data they share on these sites.”150  Additionally, 70% express concern “about the 
government accessing some of the information they share on social networking sites without 
their knowledge.”151  While this information may suggest greater privacy concern, the more 
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notable point is the lack of public response to such concerns.  If the Pew survey adequately 
mirrors the general public’s overall perception, it illustrates the point that, despite the expressed 
apprehension many feel when it comes to a perceived loss of online privacy, few have changed 
their behavior.  Rather than note a decrease in participation in social networking sites and on-line 
activity, the market continues to expand at rapid pace.  In light of this research, perhaps the more 
appropriate term for the “privacy unconcerned” is “privacy apathetic.”  Either way, the research 
supports the notion that internet users are more likely to respond to the Identity Ecosystem with 
indifference or, at most, reluctant acceptance than action. 
Second, for those identified as “privacy pragmatists,”152 the overwhelming prevalence 
and destruction caused by cybercrime, not to mention the convenience of the NSTIC, may result 
in a tendency to favor security over privacy.  The benefits of enhanced protection to deter 
cybercrime present a strong argument for the NSTIC, which may tip the scales for privacy 
pragmatists in favor of the Identity Ecosystem.  This does not lessen the concern that the NSTIC 
may actually result in decreased online security.  However, people may be willing to rely on 
governmental assurances of security or simply support the program because the government is 
finally taking action.  In other words, pragmatists may conclude that “something” is simply 
better than “nothing.” 
D. Minimal Intrusions Into Speech and Association 
Aside from these concerns, creation of the Identity Ecosystem is likely constitutional.  As 
related to speech, the NSTIC’s policy is best placed in the realm of content-neutral regulation.  
The Supreme Court in United States v. O’Brien provided the four-part test used when analyzing 
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this form of legislation.153  The Court held that, in order to remain free from unconstitutional 
restraint, the regulation must: 1) be within the constitutional power of the government, 2) further 
a substantial governmental interest, 3) be unrelated to the suppression of expression, and 4) be an 
incidental restriction on speech no greater than necessary to achieve the state’s end.154   
Applying these factors to the NSTIC demonstrates that the Identity Ecosystem as 
developed by the United States does not unconstitutionally infringe on speech.  First, legislation 
enacting the ecosystem remains within the constitutional power of the government.  The 
government certainly has the ability to regulate the internet.  Second, the purpose of the Identity 
Ecosystem is abundantly clear – protection against cybercrime.  Deterrence of this billion-dollar 
criminal enterprise certainly provides a substantial government interest, if not a compelling one.  
Third, the NSTIC is not designed to suppress speech or alter the freedom of expression in any 
way.  The purpose of the NSTIC is to provide a more secure online environment, protecting 
public and private entities from cyber-attacks.  Fourth, creation of the Identity Ecosystem results 
in a mere incidental restriction on speech no greater than necessary to achieve its result.   
The fourth factor of the O’Brien test is likely the one most open to debate.  Opponents to 
the NSTIC may argue that creation of an online identity automatically restricts speech through 
the chilling effect created by requiring an authenticated identity for online participation.  
However, this position fails for several reasons.  To begin with, it is important to emphasize that, 
unlike O’Brien, which inhibited an individual from burning his Vietnam draft card, the NSTIC 
does not directly restrict speech in any way.155  Next, as discussed above, the NSTIC simply 
provides an option for individuals to interact online.  It is a safe-haven, not an all-inclusive 
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change, to the current on-line system.  The voluntary nature and anonymity options designed 
within the program eliminates much of the concern, as individuals are free to create the 
appropriate cyber-environment that maximizes their comfort in communication.  Finally, when 
weighed against the significant governmental interest in deterring cyber-related crime and 
restoring on-line security, these concerns minimal concerns are overcome.  Such arguments 
support the conclusion that the NSTIC does not unconstitutionally infringe on a person’s right to 
free speech or association.   
E. Necessary Regulatory Measures 
While the NSTIC represents a constitutional approach to a very challenging national 
threat, it requires certain protective legislation.  The Electronic Freedom Foundation suggests 
that the “government would need new privacy laws or regulations to prohibit identity verifiers 
from selling user data or sharing it with law enforcement officials without a warrant.”156  Aside 
from these general concerns, there are two areas where legislation should be focused in order to 
protect against the constitutional concerns discussed above: 1) legislation should be enacted to 
protect the voluntary nature of the program, and 2) certain organizations and social forums 
should be given the opportunity to anonymously exist outside the Identity Ecosystem.   
First, in order to protect itself from as much constitutional scrutiny as possible, the 
voluntary nature of the program should remain intact.  Legislation should be created to reflect the 
“safe haven” paradigm discussed above, maintaining an environment where success of the 
program depends on the voluntary participation of the people at large.  While the nature of the 
program may evolve over time, depending on the program’s success, smooth transition into the 
Identity Ecosystem encourages adoption of a voluntary system to the greatest extent possible.     
                                                 
156 Singer, supra note 3. 
40 
 
Second, as tracking certain activity within the Identity Ecosystem may result in an 
unconstitutional chilling of association and free speech, anonymity should also be protected.  
Legislation should require, at a minimum: 1) full anonymity for those who choose not to 
participate in the Identity Ecosystem and 2) anonymous virtual travel to sites located beyond the 
ecosystem’s walls.  Government tracking of non-participants may produce a chilling effect on 
otherwise protected communication and participation, particularly in the realm of political 
speech.  Failure to allow anonymous participation in online organizations creates the same 
constitutional concerns posed in NAACP v. Alabama.  Requiring an individual to adopt an 
authenticated online identity before virtual participation in certain forums may be viewed as 
synonymous with compelled production of membership lists.157  Individuals “flagged” as 
nonparticipants may alter their online behavior for fear that they are being watched, thereby 
inhibiting otherwise constitutional speech or association.  Organizations and communication 
forums should be given the opportunity to anonymously remain beyond the boundaries of the 
Identity Ecosystem.   
Though the Identity Ecosystem represents a legitimate attempt to combat the cyber threat, 
the concerns posed by the NSTIC should not be taken lightly.  The practical and constitutional 
considerations are real and potentially frightening, thereby emphasizing the need for strong 
oversight and regulation of this program.  Failure to adequately legislate in the areas discussed 
above may result in an impermissible infringement on a person’s rights to privacy, free speech, 
and association.   
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VI. Conclusion 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation recently released yet another report, stating that 
“hackers have stolen more than 500 million financial records over the past 12 months.”158  
According to the FBI, “About 35% of the thefts were from website breaches, 22% were from 
cyberespionage, 14% occurred at the point of sale when someone bought something at a retail 
store, and 9% came when someone swiped a credit or debit card.”159  As one agent warns 
businesses, “You’re going to be hacked . . . .  Have a plan.”160   
The federal government has a plan.  It is called the National Strategy for Trusted 
Identities in Cyberspace.161  Creation of an online Identity Ecosystem that requires a singular, 
robust, authenticated, online identity lies at the heart of that plan.  Opponents to the NSTIC 
identify serious problems regarding the practicality of such a plan as well as the inherent 
constitutional challenges posed by a singular online identity for operations within cyberspace.  
These concerns are real and threatening, requiring immediate and continued attention by 
government officials and citizens at large.  However, the doomsday approach of some opponents 
to the NSTIC simply overplays the reality of the Identity Ecosystem.  Rather than compelling 
citizens to enter into an internet world that forces relinquishment of citizens’ anonymity, the 
Identity Ecosystem merely creates an option for internet users who yearn for greater online 
security.   
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It is too early to tell whether this program will survive.  The NSTIC is currently in 
operation, but the challenges are far from resolved.  Long term success will require significant 
oversight and federal legislation in order to protect this program from becoming exactly what 
privacy advocates fear most.  Therefore, one should applaud those who oppose the NSTIC, as 
their involvement is vital to steering a proper way forward.  While their efforts will likely not 
result in ending the program, they will ensure the Identity Ecosystem remains what it is today: a 
constitutional approach to a very serious problem.  
